Study 1
Several relations among a set of entities can be represented independently (e.g., representing 'A>B' and 'B>C', assuming that ">" denotes a dominance relation), or in a single structure (e.g., 'A>B>C'). To assess which of these two systems infants employ, we varied the difficulty of forming an integrated representation of three relations, adapting a method from studies of adults' reasoning (Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Foos, Smith, Sabol & Mynatt, 1976; Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998) . In the "continuous chain" condition, infants saw, for example, A dominating B (A>B), B dominating C (B>C) and C dominating D (C>D). In the "discontinuous chain" condition, infants were presented with the same movies but in a different order: e.g., A>B, C>D, and B>C. The test probed infants' memory for the relation between A and B. If infants memorize three isolated relations (e.g., 'A>B', 'B>C' and 'C>D'), the two conditions should be equally difficult. Alternatively, if infants integrate dominance relations into a single unified structure (e.g., memorizing 'A>B>C>D'), the discontinuous chain condition should be harder, because it requires holding two independent relations in mind ('A>B', and 'C>D'), and integrating them with the third relation ('B>C') subsequently. Conversely, in the continuous chain condition, infants can add one agent to the structure at each step (representing first 'A>B', then 'A>B>C' and finally 'A>B>C>D').
Method
Participants. Two groups of 24 15-month-olds participated (continuous chain condition: M = 467 days, range = 456-481 days; discontinuous chain condition: M = 468 days, range = 455-480 days).
Stimuli and Procedure. Two orders of presentation were used in the familiarization phase of the continuous chain condition: A>B, B>C, C>D for half the participants, and B>C, Running head: INFANTS' EXPECTATIONS FOR SOCIAL STRUCTURES ! 6 A>B, C>D for the other half. In the discontinuous chain condition, infants saw the same movies, except that the presentation orders of B>C and C>D were swapped. Two orders of presentation resulted from this procedure: A>B, C>D, B>C for half the participants, and C>D, A>B, B>C for the other half. Counterbalancing orders of presentation during familiarization controlled for possible combination of serial position order effects and memory interference.
The test probed the memory of the relation between A and B because this relation was presented at the same time point of the familiarization in the continuous and in the discontinuous chain conditions.
Results and Discussion
Significantly more infants looked longer at the incoherent test in the continuous chain condition than in the discontinuous chain condition (19 infants out of 24 vs. 11 infants out of 24; p = .036, Fisher exact test). Planned comparisons indicated that infants looked longer at the incoherent than at the coherent test in the continuous chain condition (17.6 s (SD = 9.2 s) vs. 11.6 s (SD = 9.5 s); p = .005, Wilcoxon signed rank test), but not in the discontinuous chain condition (15.8 s (SD = 9.6 s) vs. 16.0 s (SD = 11.1 s); p = .84, Wilcoxon signed rank test, see Fig. 1 ). Infants' memory for the relation between A and B was better in the continuous chain condition arguably because it made it easier to integrate several dominance relations into a single structure. Having learnt about social relations, infants integrate them into structures when they can do this incrementally, relation by relation. Stimuli and Procedure. In the linear condition two orders of presentation were used: A>B, B>C, C>D for half of participants, and B>C, C>D, A>B for the other half of participants. In the circular condition, infants saw the same movies in the same order, but D was replaced by A. Infants' memory for the relation between B and C was probed in the test of the two conditions. B and C were both subordinate and dominant an equal number of times in the familiarization. Thus, recognizing the relation between these two agents was not possible by tracking which agent garnered more attention during the whole series of familiarization movies, by assessing which character was more likely to be a "pusher" or a "pushee", or by tracking which agent was the most dominant of all.
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Results and Discussion
Infants looked significantly longer at the end of the last familiarization movie when transitivity was violated (in the circular condition) than when it was not violated (in the linear condition) (9.18 s (SD = 1.50 s) vs. In Study 2, 15-month-olds displayed sensitivity to the intransitivity of dominance relations by rejecting circular structures. Yet, in Mascaro and Csibra (2012), we found no evidence of transitive inferences on dominance relations in infants. In that study, 15-montholds observed A dominating B, and B dominating C in one context during familiarization.
They expected these two relations to be maintained in a novel context. Yet, there was no evidence that infants formed an expectation about the relationship between A and C in this same novel context. This discrepancy can be explained in two ways. First, in Study 2 the relations that served as potential premises (A>B, and B>C) and the relation violating transitivity (C>A) were presented in the same context (in which agents competed to occupy an area). Conversely, in Mascaro and Csibra (2012) , the relation violating transitivity was presented in a novel context, thus requiring infants both to draw a transitive inference and to generalize their expectation accross contexts. Second, it is also possible that infants have expectations about, or representational constraints on, the shape of dominance structures Looking times at test in the discontinuous chain and in the circular conditions, in which one may assume that 1 infants have low expectations about whom would prevail, were relatively long. They were not unlike the looking times in the unexpected test trials in the continuous chain and linear conditions. Subsequently, in our studies, looking time differences could be driven more by facilitated processing of expected events in coherent tests than by violation-of-expectation in incoherent tests. without actively drawing transitive inferences. This would explain why, when they witness A dominating B, and B dominating C, infants display no expectations about the relation between A and C (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012) , but find circular structures harder to process or less plausible (in Study 2).
Infants' sensitivity to transitivity evidenced here is much more precocious than in studies of domain-general reasoning, which found no evidence of transitive reasoning before four years (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Piaget, 1947; Wright, 2012) . This difference could come (i) from the fact that, in our study, infants' memory, and not active inferences, were tested, (ii) from the use of a different method (looking time as opposed to explicit questions), or (iii) from earlier development of sensitivity to transitivity in the social dominance domain compared to other domains (for a similar discrepancy in the preference recognition domain, see Mou, Province & Luo, 2010) .
Conclusion
Children participate in social dominance hierarchies from an early age (Caplan et al., 1991; Hawley, 1999 ). Our findings demonstrate that infants also represent dominance structures using two heuristics: They combine representations of several dyadic relations, and they have expectations about the shape of the resulting structures. Importantly, our data do not establish whether the mechanisms underpinning infants' representations of structures are domain-general or specific to social dominance (for similar issues see, Grosenick et al., 2007; Paz-y-Miño et al., 2004) . In particular, future research should investigate the relation between infants' capacity to represent dominance structures, and mechanisms supporting representations of "more" and "less" in domains such as number, size, or duration (Brannon, 2002; Fiske, 2004; Lourenco & Longo, 2011) . Interestingly, dimensions organized on ordered scales, such as number, typically show symbolic distancing effects, so that elements that are farther away on the scale are more easily discriminated (Libertus & Brannon, 2009) Our findings are consistent with the proposal of early development of a 'naïve sociology' involving conceptual representations of social entities (Kinzler & Spelke, 2007; Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; Platten, Hernik, Fonagy & Fearon, 2010; Thomsen & Carey, 2013) .
We found two signatures of the representation of social structures. First, infants' representations of structures could not be reduced to a set of isolated representations of dyadic relations. Second, infants expected dominance structures to have properties that none of the individual dominance relationships can possess, such as linearity. Combining simple elements into more complex patterned structures is crucial in domains as diverse as language, action planning, or scientific discovery. This capacity is evidenced early in the social domain.
